Article No.
11638357
Date
17.08.19
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267
Writer
국제통상협력연구소
[Trust] Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game

Chauduri, Ananish, Sarah Ali Khan, Aishwarya Lakshmiratan, Anne-Laure Py and Lisa Shah. 2003. Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 16: 331-340.

 

We use a two-person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals’ trusting
and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping
with prior research, we find that the ‘self-interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority
of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also
trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others’ trust. But people with low-trust scores often
exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These ‘inconsistent trusters’ seem to be interested
in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff.

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