Abstract

North Korea has long tried to undermine the Armistice Treaty of 1953 in order to replace it with a comprehensive peace treaty with the United States. With North Korea closing its territory to members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in 1995, the debate over the practicability of the Military Armistice Treaty has been rekindled in recent years. In a broader sense, at issue is the effectiveness of the United Nations Command in continuing to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula. How functional has the armistice treaty been in enforcing its rules? In what ways does the armistice treaty affect the inter-Korean relationship? To what extent would a U.S.-North Korea peace treaty compromise the positions of the United Nations Command and U.S. armed forces in South Korea? Keeping in mind these and other questions, this article examines first, the challenges facing the UN-sponsored armistice apparatus, and second, how the involved parties-- south Korea in particular-- may cope with these challenges to ensure permanent security in Korea. This article suggests that South Korea should propose to revive the principles raised in the Geneva Conference of 1954, especially concerning the need for the recognition of the United Nations' authority and competence to deal with Korean affairs. With the Cold War ended, the Conference stands a far better chance to survive and perhaps to resolve the Korean question once and for all. Further to this argument the article proposes a '16+2+2' formula as a new institutional structure governing the security issues on the Korean peninsula. Although the idea is till formative, it is argued that if the United States, South Korea, and the UN play their respective cards right,  the proposed arrangement may stand as good a chance as any in resolving the Korean question, especially from a south Korean vantage point.